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Abstract—We consider a two user multiple-access channel
with an eavesdropper at the receiving end. We use previously
transmitted messages as a key in the next slot till we achieve the
capacity region of the usual Multiple Access Channel (MAC).
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I. INTRODUCTION
We consider a multiple access wiretap channel (MAC-
WT), which is a multiple access channel (MAC) with an
eavesdropper tapping the channel. A MAC is one of the
fundamental building blocks in multihop networks and also
models the uplink of the most common wireless networks,
cellular networks ([1]).
For a MAC-WT in addition to reliability, the security of a
transmitted message is also very important. The security aspect
of MAC at the physical layer has been studied for two models
of MAC: (i) each transmitting user receives noisy outputs of
other users and the users treat each other as eavesdroppers
([2]), (ii) the eavesdropper is at the receiving end ([3]). In
both the cases, as in a single user case ([4]), due to security
constraints, there is a loss of achievable rates i.e., the rate
region shrinks due to security constraints on each user [2],
[5], [3]. In other multiuser scenarios also there is trade-off
between secrecy and the achievable rate region [6], [7], [8].
A Fading MAC with an eavesdropper was studied in [9],
where the authors assume that complete channel state of the
eavesdropper is available at the transmitter. In [10] the authors
showed that even if no CSI of the eavesdropper is available
at the transmitter (only the distribution of channel states is
known) it is still possible to achieve positive secrecy rates.
In a single user wiretap channel there have been various
efforts to improve secrecy rate. Most of this work relies on
a public channel or feedback. The public channel is used
to exchange a function of some correlated random variables
(which the transmitter and receiver have access to before the
communication starts), and at the end of the protocol the
transmitter and receiver agree on a secret key about which
the eavesdropper (Eve) has very little knowledge [11], [12].
This key can then be used along with a stochastic encoder to
enhance the overall secrecy rate [13], [14]. In the other case a
feedback channel from the main receiver to the transmitter is
used to exchange the secret key, which can be used to enhance
the secrecy rate [15], [16].
In some cases the secrecy capacity equal to the main channel
capacity is achieved. In [17] the authors propose a simplex
coding scheme to achieve ordinary channel capacity in a
wiretap channel. In this paper there are multiple messages to
be transmitted. The authors are able to show that only the
currently transmitted message is secure with respect to (w.r.t.)
the outputs of the eavesdropper.
In [18] the authors proposed a simple coding scheme in
which the previous securely transmitted messages are used as
secret keys in the future slots along with a stochastic encoder
to achieve the secrecy capacity close to the main channel
capacity. In this paper also, the authors are able to show
that the messages transmitted in a slot are secure w.r.t. all
the previous outputs of the eavesdropper. This scheme was
strengthened in [19] in which the legitimate users have a secret
key buffer to store the secret messages. The authors prove that
not only the current message but all the messages transmitted
after a particular slot are secure w.r.t. all the information that
the eavesdropper has till the present slot.
In this paper we extend the coding schemes of [18] and
[19] to a MAC-WT and prove that via this scheme we can
achieve the whole capacity region of the MAC. Although in the
paper due to lack of space we show the secrecy of individual
messages as in [18], the coding scheme permits us to show the
secrecy achieved in [19] and will be shown in a future work.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In Section II
we introduce the channel model and formulate the problem.
In Section III we present the main result. Finally we conclude
the paper in Section IV. Proof of a lemma is provided in the
Appendix.
II. MULTIPLE ACCESS WIRETAP CHANNEL
We consider a discrete time, memoryless two user MAC-
WT (X1 × X2, p(y, z|x1, x2),Y,Z), where X1,X2,Y,Z are
finite sets and p(y, z|x1, x2) is the collection of conditional
probability mass functions characterizing the channel. We
denote by X1 ∈ X1 and X2 ∈ X2, the inputs from the two
users to the channel, and by Y ∈ Y the corresponding output
of the channel received by Bob, the legitimate receiver and
Z ∈ Z the output received by Eve. The two users want to
send messages W (1) and W (2) to Bob reliably, while keeping
Eve ignorant about the messages.
Definition: For a MAC-WT, a (2nR1 , 2nR2 , n) codebook
consists of (1) Message sets W(1) and W(2) of cardinality
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2nR1 and 2nR2 , (2) Messages W (1) and W (2), which are
uniformally distributed over the corresponding message sets
W(1) and W(2) and are independent of each other, (3) two
stochastic encoders,
fi :W(i) → Xni i = 1, 2, (1)
and 4) Decoder at Bob:
g : Yn →W(1) ×W(2). (2)
where (Y1, . . . , Yn) , Y n ∈ Yn. The decoded messages are
denoted by (Ŵ (1), Ŵ (2)).
The average probability of error at Bob is
P (n)e , P
{(
Ŵ (1), Ŵ (2)
)
6=
(
W (1),W (2)
)}
. (3)
Leakage Rate is
R
(n)
L =
1
n
I(W (1),W (2);Zn), (4)
the rate at which information is leaked to Eve. We consider
perfect secrecy capacity rates.
Definition: The secrecy-rates (R1, R2) are achievable if
there exists a sequence of codes (2nR1 , 2nR2 , n) with P (n)e →
0 as n→∞ and
lim sup
n→∞
R
(n)
L = 0. (5)
The secrecy-rate region is the closure of the convex hull of
achievable secrecy-rate pair (R1, R2).
In [3], [20] a coding scheme to obtain the following rate
region was proposed.
Theorem 1: Rates (R1, R2) are achievable with
lim supn→∞R
(n)
L = 0, if there exist independent random
variables (X1, X2) satisfying
R1 ≤ I(X1;Y |X2)− I(X1;Z),
R2 ≤ I(X2;Y |X1)− I(X2;Z),
R1 +R2 ≤ I(X1, X2;Y )− I(X1;Z)− I(X2;Z).  (6)
The secrecy capacity region for a MAC-WT is not known.
If the secrecy constraint is not there then the capacity region
for MAC obtained from the convex closure of the regions
in Theorem 1 without the term I(Xi;Z), i = 1, 2 on the
right side of (6) (1). In the next section we show that we can
attain the capacity region of a MAC even when some secrecy
constraints are satisfied.
III. ENHANCING THE SECRECY-RATE REGION OF
MAC-WT
In this section we extend the coding-decoding scheme of
[18] for a point-to-point channel to enhance the achievable
secrecy rates for a MAC-WT. We recall that in [18] the system
is slotted with a slot consisting of n channel uses. The first
message is transmitted by using the wiretap code of [4] in slot
1. In the next slot we use the message transmitted in slot 1 as
a key along with wiretap code and transmit two messages in
that slot (keeping the number of channel uses same). Hence
Fig. 1. Achievable rates for MAC-WT with and without secrecy constraints
the secrecy-rate gets doubled. We continue to use the message
transmitted in the previous slot as a key and wiretap coding,
increasing the transmission rate till we achieve a secrecy rate
equal to the main channel capacity. From then onwards we use
only the previous message as key and no wiretap coding. This
scheme guarantees that the message which is currently being
transmitted is secure w.r.t. all the Eavsdropper’s outputs, i.e.,
if message Wk is transmitted in slot k then
1
n
I(Wk;Z
n
1 , . . . , Z
n
k )→ 0, (7)
as the codeword length n→∞, where Zni is the data received
by Eve in slot i.
In the following, not only we extend this coding scheme to a
MAC-WT but also modify it so that it can be used to improve
its secrecy criterion (7) and for fading channels as well. These
extensions will be presented in future work. Currently the
secrecy criterion used in the following is: If user i transmits
message W
(i)
k in slot k, we need
I(W
(1)
l ,W
(2)
l ;Z
n
1 , . . . , Z
n
k ) ≤ 2n1, for l = 1, . . . , k (8)
for any given  > 0. This will be strengthened to strong
secrecy, I(W
(1)
k ,W
(2)
k ;Z
n
1 , . . . , Z
n
k ) → 0 as n → ∞ at the
end of the section. We modify message sets and encoders and
decoders with respect to Section II as follows.
The message sets are W(i) = {1, . . . , 2nRsi } for users
i = 1, 2, where (Rs1, R
s
2) satisfy (6) for some (X1, X2). The
encoders have two parts for both users,
fs1 :W(1) → Xn11 , fd1 :W(1) ×K1 → Xn21 (9)
fs2 :W(2) → Xn12 , fd2 :W(2) ×K2 → Xn22 , (10)
where Xi ∈ Xi, i = 1, 2, and Ki, i = 1, 2 are the sets of
secret keys generated for the respective user, fsi , i = 1, 2 are
the wiretap encoders corresponding to each user as in [3] and
fdi , i = 1, 2 are the usual deterministic encoders corresponding
to each user . Also, n1 + n2 = n.
Observe that, for transmitted messages W (i), i = 1, 2 and
the corresponding received data Zn by Eve,
I(W (1),W (2);Zn)
= I(W (1);Zn) + I(W (2);Zn|W (1))
= H(W (1))−H(W (1)|Zn) +H(W (2))
−H(W (2)|Zn,W (1))
(a)
≤ H(W (1)|Xn2 )−H(W (1)|Zn, Xn2 ) +H(W (2)|Xn1 )
−H(W (2)|Zn, Xn1 )
= I(W (1);Zn|Xn2 ) + I(W (2);Zn|Xn1 ), (11)
where (a) follows from the facts: conditioning decreases
entropy, messages are independent and a codeword is
a function of the message to be transmitted. Thus if
lim supn→∞ I(W
(i);Zn|Xnj )/n = 0, i = 1, 2, then R(n)L →
0.
The following is our main result.
Theorem 2: The secrecy-rate region satisfying (8) is the
usual MAC region without Eve, i.e., it is the closure of convex
hull of all rate pair (R1, R2) satisfying
R1 ≤ I(X1;Y |X2), R2 ≤ I(X2;Y |X1),
R1 +R2 ≤ I(X1, X2;Y ), (12)
for some independent random variables X1, X2.
Proof : We fix distributions pX1 , pX2 . Initially we take n1 =
n2 = n/2. In slot 1, user i selects message W(i)1 ∈ W(i) to
be transmitted confidentially. Both the users use the wiretap
coding scheme of [3]. Hence the rate pair (R1, R2) satisfies
(6) and (7). In slot 2, each user uses previously transmitted
secure message as key to enhance the rate. The two users
select two messages each to be transmitted, (W
(1)
21 ,W
(1)
22 ) ≡
W
(1)
2 and (W
(2)
21 ,W
(2)
22 ) ≡ W
(2)
2 . Both users use the wiretap
coding scheme (as in [3]) for first part of the message, i.e.,
(W
(1)
21 ,W
(2)
21 ), and for the second part user i first takes XOR
of W
(i)
22 with the previous message, i.e., W
(i)
22 ⊕W
(i)
1 . This
XORed message is transmitted over the MAC-WT using a
usual MAC coding scheme ([21], [22]). Hence the secure rate
achievable in both parts of slot 2 satisfies (6) for both the
users. This is also the overall rate of slot 2.
In slot 3, in the first part the rate satisfies (6) via wiretap
coding. But in the second part we XOR with W
(i)
2 and are
able to send two messages and hence double the rate of (6)
(assuming 2(R1, R2) via (6) is within the range of (12)). We
continue like this.
Define
λ1 ,
⌈
I(X1;Y |X2)
I(X1;Y |X2)− I(X1;Z)
⌉
, (13)
where dxe is the smallest integer ≥ x. In slot λ1 + 1 the rate
of user 1 in second part of the slot satisfies,
R1 ≤ min (λ1 (I(X1;Y |X2)− I(X1;Z)) , I(X1;Y |X2))
= I(X1;Y |X2). (14)
Similarly we define λ2 as
λ2 ,
⌈
I(X2;Y |X1)
I(X2;Y |X1)− I(X2;Z)
⌉
. (15)
In slot λ2 + 1, the rate R2 will satisfy
R2 ≤ I(X2;Y |X1). (16)
In slot λ = max{λ1, λ2}+ 1, the sum-rate will satisfy
R1 +R2 ≤ (17)
min
{
λ
[
I(X1, X2;Y )−
2∑
i=1
I(Xi;Z)
]
, I(X1, X2;Y )
}
.
After some slot, say, λ∗ > λ, the sum-rate will get saturated
by sum-capacity term, i.e., I(X1, X2;Y ), and hence thereafter
the rate pair (R1, R2) in the second part of the slot will satisfy
(12) and the overall rate for the slot is the average in the first
part and the second part of the slot.
In slot k, (where k > λ∗) to transmit a message pair
(W
(1)
k ,W
(2)
k ), where W
(i)
k = (W
(i)
k,1,W
(i)
k,2), i = 1, 2, we use
wiretap coding for (W
(1)
k,1,W
(2)
k,1) and for the second part, we
XOR it with the previous message i.e., W
(i)
k,2 ⊕W
(i)
k−1, i =
1, 2, and transmit the overall codeword over the MAC-WT.
To get the overall rate of a slot close to that in (12), we
make n2 = ln1. By taking l large enough, we can come
arbitrarily close to the region in (12). For this coding scheme,
Pne → 0. Combination of the rates in (12) can be obtained by
time sharing. Now we show that, it also satisfies (8).
Leakage Rate Analysis: Before we proceed, we define the
notation to be used here. For user i, the codeword sent in slot
k will be represented by X(i)k . Correspondingly X
(i)
k,1 and X
(i)
k,2
will represent n1-length and n2-length codewords of user i in
slot k. When we consider i to be 1 or 2, i¯ will be taken as 2 or
1 respectively. In slot k, the noisy codeword received by Eve is
Znk ≡ (Zn1k,1, Zn2k,2), where Zn1k,1 is the sequence corresponding
to the wiretap coding part and Zn2k,2 is corresponding to the
XOR part (in which the previous message is used as a key).
We also note that in slot 1, n = n1 (i.e., it does not have the
second part). For random variables X,Y , X ⊥ Y denotes that
X is independent of Y .
In slot 1, since wiretap coding of [3] is employed, the
leakage rate satisfies
I(W
(1)
1 ;Z
n
1 |X(2)1 ) ≤ n1, I(W
(2)
1 ;Z
n
1 |X(1)1 ) ≤ n1. (18)
For slot 2 we show, for user 1,
I(W
(1)
1 ;Z
n
1 , Z
n
2 |X(22 ) ≤ n1,
I(W
(1)
2 ;Z
n
1 , Z
n
2 |X(2)2 ) ≤ n1. (19)
Similarly one can show for user 2. We first note that
I(W
(1)
1 ;Z
n
1 , Z
n
2 |X(2)2 )
= I(W
(1)
1 ;Z
n
1 ) + I(W
(1)
1 ;Z
n
2 |Zn1 ,X(2)2 )
(a)
≤ n1+H(W (1)1 |Zn1 ,X(2)2 )−H(W
(1)
1 |Zn1 ,X(2)2 , Zn2 )
(b)
= n1+H(W
(1)
1 |Zn1 )−H(W
(1)
1 |Zn1 ) = n1. (20)
where (a) follows from wiretap coding and (b) follows by the
fact that X(2)2 ⊥ (W
(1)
1 , Z
n
1 ), and (X
(2)
2 , Z
n
2 ) ⊥ (W
(1)
1 , Z
n
1 ).
Next consider
I(W
(1)
2 ;Z
n
1 , Z
n
2 |X(2)2 )
= I(W
(1)
2,1,W
(1)
2,2;Z
n
1 , Z
n
2 |X(2)2 )
= I(W
(1)
2,1;Z
n
1 , Z
n
2 |X(2)2 ) + I(W
(1)
2,2;Z
n
1 , Z
n
2 |X(2)2 ,W
(1)
2,1)
, I1 + I2. (21)
We get upper bounds on I1 and I2. The first term,
I1 = I(W
(1)
2,1;Z
n
1 , Z
n
2 |X(2)2 )
= I(W
(1)
2,1;Z
n
1 , Z
n1
2,1, Z
n2
2,2|X(2)2 )
= I(W
(1)
2,1;Z
n
1 |X(2)2 ) + I(W
(1)
2,1;Z
n1
2,1|X(2)2 , Zn1 )
+ I(W
(1)
2,1;Z
n2
2,2|X(2)2 , Zn1 , Zn12,1)
(a)
= 0 + I(W
(1)
2,1;Z
n1
2,1|X(2)2,1,X(2)2,2, Zn1 )
+ I(W
(1)
2,1;Z
n2
2,2|X(2)2 , Zn1 , Zn12,1)
, I11 + I12, (22)
where (a) follows because Zn1 ⊥ (W
(1)
21 ,X
(2)
2 ). Furthermore,
I11 = I(W
(1)
2,1;Z
n1
2,1|X(2)2,1,X(2)2,2, Zn1 )
= H(W
(1)
2,1; |X(2)2,1,X(2)2,2, Zn1 )
−H(W (1)2,1; |Zn12,1,X(2)2,1,X(2)2,2, Zn1 )
(a)
= H(W
(1)
2,1; |X(2)2,1)−H(W
(1)
2,1; |Zn12,1,X(2)2,1)
= I(W
(1)
2,1;Z
n1
2,1, |X(2)2,1)
(b)
≤ n1, (23)
where (a) follows since (X(2)2,2, Zn1 ) ⊥ (W
(1)
2,1, Z
n1
2,1,X
(2)
2,1) and
(b) follows since the first part of the message is encoded via
the usual coding scheme for MAC-WT.
Also,
I12 = I(W
(1)
2,1;Z
n2
2,2|X(2)2 , Zn1 , Zn12,1)
= H(W
(1)
2,1; |X(2)2,1,X(2)2,2, Zn1 , Zn12,1)
−H(W (1)2,1|X(2)2,1,X(2)2,2, Zn1 , Zn12,1, Zn22,2)
(a)
= H(W
(1)
2,1; |X(2)2,1, Zn12,1)−H(W
(1)
2,1; |X(2)2,1, Zn12,1) = 0,
where (a) follows since (X(2)2,2, Zn1 , Z
n2
2,2) ⊥
(W
(1)
2,1,X
(2)
2,1, Z
n1
2,1).
From (21), (22) and (23) we have I1 = I11 + I12 ≤ n1.
Next consider,
I2 = I(W
(1)
2,2;Z
n
1 , Z
n
2 |X(2)2 ,W
(1)
2,1)
= I(W
(1)
2,2;Z
n
2 |X(2)2 ,W
(1)
2,1)
+ I(W
(1)
2,2;Z
n
1 |X(2)2 ,W
(1)
2,1, Z
n
2 ). (24)
We have,
I(W
(1)
2,2;Z
n
2 |X(2)2 ,W
(1)
2,1)
= I(W
(1)
2,2;Z
n1
2,1|X(2)2 ,W
(1)
2,1)
+ I(W
(1)
2,2;Z
n2
2,2|X(2)2 ,W
(1)
2,1, Z
n1
2,1)
(a1)
= 0 + I(W
(1)
2,2;Z
n2
2,2|X(2)2 ,W
(1)
2,1, Z
n1
2,1)
(a2)
= I(W
(1)
2,2;Z
n2
2,2|X(2)2,2)
(a3)
= 0,
and (a1) follows since W
(1)
2,2 ⊥ (Zn12,1,X(2)2 ,W
(1)
2,1); (a2) holds
because (X(2)2,1,W
(1)
2,1) ⊥ (W
(1)
2,2, Z
n1
2,2,X
(2)
2,2); and (a3) is true
since W
(1)
2,2 ⊥ (X(2)2,2, Zn22,2).
Also,
I(W
(1)
2,2;Z
n
1 |X(2)2 ,W
(1)
2,1, Z
n
2 )
= I(W
(1)
2,2;Z
n
1 |X(2)2,1,X(2)2,2,W
(1)
2,1, Z
n1
2,1, Z
n2
2,2)
(b1)
= I(W
(1)
2,2;Z
n
1 |X(2)2,2, Zn22,2)
(b2)
= 0,
where (b1) follows since (W
(1)
2,1, Z
n1
2,1,X
(2)
2,1) ⊥
(Zn22,2,X
(2)
2,2,W
(1)
2,2, Z
n
1 )), and (b2) follows because
Zn1 ⊥ (W
(1)
2,2,X
(2)
2,2, Z
n2
2,2). Hence from (24) we have
I2 = 0.
From (21) we have
I(W
(1)
2 ;Z
n
1 , Z
n
2 |X(2)2 ) ≤ n1. (25)
Similarly one can show that
I(W
(2)
2 ;Z
n
1 , Z
n
2 |X(1)2 ) ≤ n1. (26)
Therefore , from (11),
I(W
(1)
2 ,W
(2)
2 ;Z
n
1 , Z
n
2 )
≤ I(W (1)2 ;Zn1 , Zn2 |X(2)2 ) + I(W
(2)
2 ;Z
n
1 , Z
n
2 |X(1)2 ).
To prove that (8) holds for any slot, we use mathematical
induction in the following lemma.
Lemma 1: Let (8) hold for k, then it also holds for k + 1.
Proof : See Appendix. 
A. A note about strong secrecy
The notion of secrecy used above is weak secrecy, i.e.,
if message W is transmitted and Eve receives Zn, then
I(W ;Zn) ≤ n. Strong Secrecy requires that I(W ;Zn) ≤ .
In single user case, if strong secrecy notion is used instead of
weak secrecy, the secrecy capacity does not change ([23]). The
same result has been proved for Multiple Access Channel with
wiretapper in [24] using the channel resolvability technique. In
our coding scheme of Theorem 2 if we use resolvability based
coding in slot 1, and in subsequent slots use both resolvability
based coding (in the first part of the slot) and the previous
message (which is now strongly secure w.r.t. Eve) as key in the
second part of the slot, we can achieve the same secrecy-rate
region (capacity region of usual MAC without Eve), satisfying
the leakage rate
lim sup
n→∞
I(W
(1)
k ,W
(2)
k ;Z
n
1 , Z
n
2 , . . . , Z
n
k ) = 0, (27)
as n → ∞, because in the RHS of (8), we can get  instead
of 2n1.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we revisit the secrecy-rate region for a multiple
access wiretap channel. We show that by using the previous
message as a key in the next slot we can achieve secrecy-rate
region equal to the capacity region of a MAC.
Our coding scheme can be used to enhance the secrecy
criteria of (8) to
1
n
I(W
(1)
k ,W
(2)
k ,W
(1)
k−1,W
(2)
k−1, . . . ,W
(1)
k−N ,W
(2)
k−N ; Z)→ 0,
as n→∞, where Z = (Zn1 , . . . , Znk ) and N can be taken as
large as we wish. This will be shown in a future work.
APPENDIX
Proof of Lemma 1
In slot k + 1, for m = 1, . . . , k,
I(W
(1)
m ;Z
n
1 , Z
n
2 , . . . , Z
n
k+1|X(2)k+1)
= I(W
(1)
m ;Z
n
1 , Z
n
2 , . . . , Z
n
k |X(2)k+1)
+ I(W
(1)
m ;Z
n
k+1|X(2)k+1, Zn1 , Zn2 , . . . , Znk )
, I1 + I2. (28)
Consider
I1 = I(W
(1)
m ;Z
n
1 , Z
n
2 , . . . , Z
n
k |X(2)k+1)
(a)
= I(W
(1)
m ;Z
n
1 , Z
n
2 , . . . , Z
n
k )
= H(W
(1)
m )−H(W
(1)
m |Zn1 , Zn2 , . . . , Znk )
(b)
≤ H(W (1)m |X(2)k )−H(W
(1)
m |Zn1 , Zn2 , . . . , Znk ,X(2)k )
= I(W
(1)
m ;Z
n
1 , Z
n
2 , . . . , Z
n
k |X(2)k )
(c)
≤ n1,
where (a) follows from X(2)k+1 ⊥ (W
(1)
m , Z
n
1 , Z
n
2 , . . . , Z
n
k ), (b)
follows from W
(1)
m ⊥ X(2)k and the fact that conditioning de-
creases entropy; and (c) follows from the induction hypothesis.
Next consider
I2 = I(W
(1)
m ;Z
n
k+1|X(2)k+1, Zn1 , Zn2 , . . . , Znk )
= I(W
(1)
m ;Z
n1
k+1,1, Z
n2
k+1,2|X(2)k+1, Zn1 , Zn2 , . . . , Znk )
= I(W
(1)
m ;Z
n1
k+1,1|X(2)k+1, Zn1 , Zn2 , . . . , Znk )
+ I(W
(1)
m ;Z
n2
k+1,2|X(2)k+1, Zn1 , Zn2 , . . . , Znk , Zn1k+1,1)
= I(W
(1)
m,1;Z
n1
k+1,1|X(2)k+1, Zn1 , Zn2 , . . . , Znk )
+ I(W
(1)
m,2;Z
n1
k+1,1|X(2)k+1, Zn1 , Zn2 , . . . , Znk ,W
(1)
m,1)
+ I(W
(1)
m,1;Z
n2
k+1,2|X(2)k+1, Zn1 , Zn2 , . . . , Znk , Zn1k+1,1)
+ I(W
(1)
m,2;Z
n2
k+1,2|X(2)k+1, Zn1 , . . . , Znk , Zn1k+1,1,W
(1)
m,1)
= I21 + I22 + I23 + I24. (29)
Now we consider each of these terms. Observe that,
I21 = I(W
(1)
m,1;Z
n1
k+1,1|X(2)k+1, Zn1 , Zn2 , . . . , Znk )
= H(W
(1)
m,1|X(2)k+1, Zn1 , Zn2 , . . . , Znk )
−H(W (1)m,1|X(2)k+1, Zn1 , Zn2 , . . . , Znk , Zn1k+1,1)
(a)
= H(W
(1)
m,1|Zn1 , Zn2 , . . . , Znk )
−H(W (1)m,1|Zn1 , Zn2 , . . . , Znk , Zn1k+1,1,X(2)k+1)
(b)
= H(W
(1)
m,1|Zn1 , Zn2 , . . . , Znk )
−H(W (1)m,1|Zn1 , Zn2 , . . . , Znk ) = 0, (30)
where (a) follows from X(2)k+1 ⊥ (W
(1)
m,1, Z
n
1 , . . . , Z
n
k ), (b)
follows since (Zk+1,1,X
(2)
k+1) ⊥ (W
(1)
m,1, Z
n
1 , . . . , Z
n
k ).
Next we observe that
I22 = I(W
(1)
m,2;Z
n1
k+1,1|X(2)k+1, Zn1 , Zn2 , . . . , Znk ,W
(1)
m,1)
= H(W
(1)
m,2|X(2)k+1, Zn1 , Zn2 , . . . , Znk ,W
(1)
m,1)
−H(W (1)m,2|X(2)k+1, Zn1 , Zn2 , . . . , Znk ,W
(1)
m,1, Z
n1
k+1,1)
(a)
= H(W
(1)
m,2)−H(W
(1)
m,2) = 0, (31)
where (a) follows since W
(1)
m,2 ⊥
(X(2)k+1, Z
n
1 , . . . , Z
n
k , Z
n
k+1,1,W
(1)
m,1).
For the third term in (29), we have
I23 = I(W
(1)
m,1;Z
n2
k+1,2|X(2)k+1, Zn1 , Zn2 , . . . , Znk , Zn1k+1,1)
= H(W
(1)
m,1|X(2)k+1, Zn1 , Zn2 , . . . , Znk , Zn1k+1,1)
−H(W (1)m,1|X(2)k+1, Zn1 , Zn2 , . . . , Znk , Zn1k+1,1, Zn2k+1,2)
(a)
= H(W
(1)
m,1|Zn1 , . . . , Znk )−H(W
(1)
m,1|Zn1 , . . . , Znk ) = 0,
where (a) follows from the fact that (X(2)k+1, Z
n
k+1,1) ⊥
(W
(1)
m,1, Z
n
1 , Z
n
2 , . . . , Z
n
k ) and (X
(2)
k+1, Z
n
k+1,1, Z
2
k+1,2) ⊥
(W
(1)
m,1, Z
n
1 , Z
n
2 , . . . , Z
n
k ).
Finally,
I24 = I(W
(1)
m,2;Z
n2
k+1,2|X(2)k+1, Zn1 . . . , Znk , Zn1k+1,1,W
(1)
m,1) = 0,
because W
(1)
m,2 ⊥ (X(2)k+1, Zn1k+1,1,W
(1)
m,1, Z
n
k+1,2, Z
n
1 , . . . , Z
n
k ).
From above results and (29) we have I2 = I21+I22+I23+
I24 = 0, so from (28) we have I = I1 + I2 ≤ n1, and hence
I(W
(1)
m ;Z
n
1 , Z
n
2 , . . . , Z
n
k+1|X(2)k+1) ≤ n1, m = 1, . . . , k.
Next we show that
I(W
(1)
k+1;Z
n
1 , Z
n
2 , . . . , Z
n
k+1|X(2)k+1) ≤ n1. (32)
We have
I(W
(1)
k+1;Z
n
1 , Z
n
2 , . . . , Z
n
k+1|X(2)k+1)
= I(W
(1)
k+1,1,W
(1)
k+1,2;Z
n
1 , Z
n
2 , . . . , Z
n
k+1|X(2)k+1)
= I(W
(1)
k+1,1;Z
n
1 , Z
n
2 , . . . , Z
n
k+1|X(2)k+1)
+ I(W
(1)
k+1,2;Z
n
1 , Z
n
2 , . . . , Z
n
k+1|X(2)k+1,W
(1)
k+1,1)
= I(W
(1)
k+1,1;Z
n
1 , Z
n
2 , . . . , Z
n
k |X(2)k+1)
+ I(W
(1)
k+1,1;Z
n
k+1|Zn1 , Zn2 , . . . , Znk ,X(2)k+1)
+ I(W
(1)
k+1,2;Z
n
1 , Z
n
2 , . . . , Z
n
k+1|X(2)k+1,W
(1)
k+1,1)
= I1 + I2 + I3, (33)
where I1 = 0 since (W
(1)
k+1,1,X
(2)
k+1) ⊥ (Zn1 , Zn2 , . . . , Znk ),
and
I2 = I(W
(1)
k+1,1;Z
n
k+1|Zn1 , Zn2 , . . . , Znk ,X(2)k+1)
= I(W
(1)
k+1,1;Z
n1
k+1,1, Z
n
k+1,2|Zn1 , Zn2 , . . . , Znk ,X(2)k+1)
= I(W
(1)
k+1,1;Z
n2
k+1,2|Zn1 , Zn2 , . . . , Znk ,X(2)k+1)
+ I(W
(1)
k+1,1;Z
n1
k+1,1|Zn1 . . . , Znk ,X(2)k+1, Znk+1,2)
(a)
= 0 + I(W
(1)
k+1,1;Z
n1
k+1,1|Zn1 , . . . , Znk ,X(2)k+1, Znk+1,2)
= I(W
(1)
k+1,1;Z
n1
k+1,1|Zn1 , . . . , Znk ,X(2)k+1,1,X(2)k+1,2, Znk+1,2)
= H(W
(1)
k+1,1|Zn1 , . . . , Znk ,X(2)k+1,1,X(2)k+1,2, Znk+1,2)
−H(W (1)k+1,1|Zn1 , . . . , Znk ,X(2)k+1,1, Znk+1,1,X(2)k+1,2, Znk+1,2)
(b)
= H(W
(1)
k+1,1|X(2)k+1,1)−H(W
(1)
k+1,1|X(2)k+1,1, Znk+1,1)
= I(W
(1)
k+1,1;Z
n
k+1,1|X(2)k+1,1)
(c)
≤ n1, (34)
where (a) follows since (Zn1 , Z
n
2 , . . . , Z
n
k ) ⊥
(W
(1)
k+1,1, Z
n1
k+1,1,X
(2)
k+1) and W
(1)
k+1,1 ⊥ (X(2)k+1), Zn1k+1,1);
(b) follows since (Zn1 , Z
n
2 , . . . , Z
n
k , Z
n
k+1,2,X
(2)
k+1,2) ⊥
(W
(1)
k+1,1,X
(2)
k+1,1) and (Z
n
1 , Z
n
2 , . . . , Z
n
k , Z
n
k+1,2,X
(2)
k+1,2) ⊥
(W
(1)
k+1,1, Z
n1
k+1,1,X
(2)
k+1,1) and (c) follows from the coding
scheme for MAC-WT ([3]).
Now we evaluate I3. We have
I3 = I(W
(1)
k+1,2;Z
n
1 , Z
n
2 , . . . , Z
n
k+1|X(2)k+1,W
(1)
k+1,1)
= I(W
(1)
k+1,2;Z
n
1 , Z
n
2 , . . . , Z
n
k |X(2)k+1,W
(1)
k+1,1)
+ I(W
(1)
k+1,2;Z
n
k+1|X(2)k+1,W
(1)
k+1,1, Z
n
1 , Z
n
2 , . . . , Z
n
k )
(a)
= 0 + I(W
(1)
k+1,2;Z
n
k+1|X(2)k+1,W
(1)
k+1,1, Z
n
1 , Z
n
2 , . . . , Z
n
k )
= H(W
(1)
k+1,2|X(2)k+1,W
(1)
k+1,1, Z
n
1 , Z
n
2 , . . . , Z
n
k )
−H(W (1)k+1,2|X(2)k+1,W
(1)
k+1,1, Z
n
1 , Z
n
2 , . . . , Z
n
k , Z
n
k+1)
(b)
= H(W
(1)
k+1,2)−H(W
(1)
k+1,2) = 0, (35)
where (a) follows since W
(1)
k+1,2 ⊥
(Zn1 , Z
n
2 , . . . , Z
n
k ,X
(2)
k+1,W
(1)
k+1,1); (b) follows since
W
(1)
k+1,2 ⊥ (Zn1 , Zn2 , . . . , Znk , Znk+1,X(2)k+1,W
(1)
k+1,1). Hence
from (33), we have
I(W
(1)
k+1;Z
n
1 , Z
n
2 , . . . , Z
n
k+1|X(2)k+1) ≤ n1.  (36)
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